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1 Abstract
This chapter demystifies P-values, hypothesis tests and significance tests, and
introduces the concepts of local evidence and global error rates. The local
evidence is embodied in this data and concerns the hypotheses of interest for
this experiment, whereas the global error rate is a property of the statistical
analysis and sampling procedure. It is shown using simple examples that local
evidence and global error rates can be, and should be, considered together when
making inferences. Power analysis for experimental design for hypothesis testing
are explained, along with the more locally focussed expected P-values. Issues
relating to multiple testing, HARKing, and P-hacking are explained, and it
is shown that, in many situation, their effects on local evidence and global
error rates are in conflict, a conflict that can always be overcome by a fresh
dataset from replication of key experiments. Statistics is complicated, and so is
science. There is no singular right way to do either, and universally acceptable
compromises may not exist. Statistics offers a wide array of tools for assisting
with scientific inference by calibrating uncertainty, but statistical inference is
not a substitute for scientific inference. P-values are useful indices of evidence
and deserve their place in the statistical toolbox of basic pharmacologists.
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2 Introduction
There is a widespread consensus that we are in the midst of a ‘reproducibility cri-
sis’ and that inappropriate application of statistical methods facilitates, or even
causes, irreproducibility [Ioannidis, 2005, Nuzzo, 2014, Colquhoun, 2014, George
et al., 2017, Wagenmakers et al., 2018]. P-values are a “pervasive problem”
[Wagenmakers, 2007] because they are misunderstood, misapplied, and answer
a question that no-one asks [Royall, 1997, Halsey et al., 2015, Colquhoun, 2014].
They exaggerate evidence [Johnson, 2013, Benjamin et al., 2018] or they are ir-
reconcilable with evidence [Berger and Sellke, 1987]. What’s worse, ‘P-hacking’
amplifies their intrinsic shortcomings [Fraser et al., 2018]. The inescapable con-
clusion, it would seem, is that P-values should be eliminated by replacement
with Bayes factors [Goodman, 2001, Wagenmakers, 2007] or confidence inter-
vals [Cumming, 2008], or by simply doing without [Trafimow and Marks, 2015].
However, much of the blame for irreproducibility that is apportioned to P-values
is based on pervasive and pernicious misunderstandings.
This chapter is an attempt to resolve those misunderstandings. Some might
say it is a reckless attempt because history suggests that it is doomed to fail-
ure, and reckless also because it goes against much of the conventional wisdom
regarding P-values and will therefore be seen by some as promoting inappropri-
ate statistical practices. That’s OK though, because the conventional wisdom
regarding P-values is mistaken in important ways, and those mistakes fuel false
suppositions regarding what practices are appropriate.
2.1 On the role of statistics
Statistics is complicated1 but is usually presented simplistically in the statistics
textbooks and courses studied by pharmacologists. Readers of those books and
graduates of those courses should therefore be forgiven for wrongly assuming
that statistics is a set of rules and recipes that must be applied in order to obtain
a statistically valid statistically significant. The instructions say that you match
the data to the recipe, turn the crank, and bingo: it’s significant, or not. If you
do it right then you might rewarded with a star! No matter how explicable
that simplistic view of statistics might be, it is far too limiting. It leads to
1Even its grammatical form is complicated: “statistics” looks like a plural noun, but it
both plural when referring to values calculated from data and singular when referring to the
discipline or approaches to data analysis.
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thoughtless use of a limited set of methods and to over-reliance on the familiar
but misunderstood P-value. It prevents the full utilisation of statistical thinking
within scientific inference, and allows bad statistics to license false inferences.
We have to aim for more than the rote-learning of recipes in statistics courses
because while statistics is not simple, good science is harder. I therefore take
as a working assumption the notion that good scientists are capable of dealing
with the intricacies of statistical thinking.
I will admit up front that it is not essential to have a statistical inference in
order to make a scientific inference. For example, there is little need for a formal
statistical analysis if results can be dealt with using the inter-ocular impact
test2. However, scientific inferences can be made more securely with statistics
because it offers a rich set of tools for calibrating uncertainty. Statistical analysis
is particularly helpful in the penumbral ‘maybe zone’ where the uncertainty
is relatively evenly balanced—the zone where scientists are most likely to be
swayed by biasses into over-interpretation of random deviations within the noise.
The extra insight from a well-implemented statistical analysis can protect from
the desire to find something notable, and thereby reduce the number of false
claims made.
Most people need all the help they can get to prevent them mak-
ing fools of themselves by claiming that their favourite theory is
substantiated by observations that do nothing of the sort.
—[Colquhoun, 1971, p. 1]
Improved utilisation of statistical approaches would indeed help to min-
imise the number of times that pharmacologists make fools of themselves by
reducing the number of false positive results in pharmacological journals and,
consequently, reduce the number of faulty leads that fail to translate into a ther-
apeutic [Begley and Ellis, 2012]. However, even ideal application of the most
appropriate statistical methods would not improve the replicability of published
results quite as much as might be assumed because not every result that fails
to be replicated is a false positive and not every mistaken conclusion would be
prevented by better statistical inferences.
Basic pharmacological studies are typically performed using biological mod-
els such as cell lines, tissue samples, or laboratory animals and so even if the
original results are not false positives a replication might fail when it is con-
ducted using different models, [Drucker, 2016]. Replications might also fail
when the original results are critically dependent on unrecognised methodolog-
ical details, or on reagents such as antibodies that have properties that can
vary over time or between sources [Berglund et al., 2008, Baker and Dolgin,
2017, Voelkl et al., 2018]. It is those types of irreproducibility rather than false
positives that are responsible for many failures of published leads to translate
into clinical targets or therapeutics (see also Chapter 11). The distinction being
made here is between false positive inferences which lack ‘internal validity’ and
2In other words, results that hit you right between the eyes. In the Australian vernacular
the inter-ocular impact test is the bloody obvious test.
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failures of generalisability which lack ‘external validity’ even though correct in
themselves. It is an important distinction because the former can be reduced
by more appropriate use of statistical methods but the latter can not.
The inherent objectivity of statistics can minimise the number of times that
we make fools of ourselves, but just doing statistics is not enough, because it is
not a set of rules for scientists to follow to make automated scientific inferences.
To get from calibrated statistical inferences to reliable inferences about the
real world, the statistical analyses have to be interpreted; thoughtfully and
in the full knowledge of the properties of the tool and the nature of the real
world system being probed. Some researchers might be disconcerted by the fact
that statistics cannot provide such certainty, because they just want to be told
whether their latest result is “real”. No matter how attractive it might be to fob
off onto statistics the responsibility for inferences, the answers that scientists
seek cannot be answered by statistics alone.
3 All about P-values
P-values are not everything, and they are certainly not nothing. There are many,
many useful procedures and tools in statistics that do not involve or provide P-
values, but P-values are by far the most widely used inferential statistic in basic
pharmacological research papers.0
P-values are a practical success but a critical failure. Scientists the
world over use them, but scarcely a statistician can be found to
defend them. —[Senn, 2001, p. 193]
Not only are P-values rarely defended, they are frequently derided (e.g.
Berger and Sellke [1987], Lecoutre et al. [2001], Goodman [2001], Wagenmakers
[2007]). Even so, support for the continued use of P-values for at least some
purposes with some caveats can be found (e.g. Nickerson [2000], Senn [2001],
Garc´ıa-Pe´rez [2016], Krueger and Heck [2017]). One crucial caveat is that a
clear distinction has to be drawn between the dichotomisation of P-values into
‘significant’ or ‘not significant’ (typically on the basis of a threshold set at 0.05)
and the evidential meaning of the actual numerically specified P-value. The
former comes from a hypothesis test and the latter from a significance test.
Contrary to what many readers will think and have been taught, they are not
the same things. It might be argued that the battle to retain a clear distinction
between significance tests and hypothesis tests has long been lost, but I have to
continue that battle here because that distinction is critical for understanding
the uses and misuses of P-values. Detailed accounts can also be found elsewhere
[Huberty, 1993, Senn, 2001, Hubbard et al., 2003, Lenhard, 2006, Hurlbert and
Lombardi, 2009, Lew, 2012].
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3.1 Hypothesis test and Significance test
When comparing significance tests and hypothesis tests it is conventional to
note that the former are ‘Fisherian’ (or, perhaps, “neoFisherian” [Hurlbert and
Lombardi, 2009]) and the latter are ‘Neyman–Pearsonian’. R.A. Fisher did not
invent significance tests per se—Gossett published what became Student’s t-test
before Fisher’s career had begun [Student, 1908] and even that is not the first
example—but Fisher did effectively popularise their use with his book Statistical
Methods for Research Workers (1925), and he is credited with (or blamed for!)
the convention of P< 0.05 as a criterion for ‘significance’. It is important to
note that Fisher’s ‘significant’ denoted something along the lines of worthy of
further consideration or investigation, which is different to what is denoted by
the same word applied tot he results of a hypothesis test. Hypothesis tests came
later, with the 1933 paper by Neyman & Pearson that set out the workings of
dichotomising hypothesis tests and also introduced of the ideas “errors of the
first kind” (false positive errors; type I errors) and “errors of the second kind”
(false negative errors; type II errors) and a formalisation of the concept of
statistical power.
A Neyman–Pearsonian hypothesis test is more than a simple statistical cal-
culation. It is a method that properly encompasses experimental planning and
experimenter behaviour as well. Before an experiment is conducted, the exper-
imenter chooses α, the size of the critical region in the distribution of the test
statistic, on the basis of the acceptable false positive (i.e. type I) error rate
and sets the sample size on the basis of an acceptable false negative (i.e. type
II) error rate. In effect the sample size, power3, and α are traded off against
each other to obtain an experimental design with the appropriate mix of cost
and error rates. In order for the error rates of the procedure to be well cal-
ibrated, the sample size and α have to be set in advance of the experiment
being performed, a detail that is often overlooked by pharmacologists. After
the experiment has been run and the data are in hand, the mechanics of the
test involves a determination of whether the observed value of the test statistic
lies within a pre-determined critical region under the sampling distribution pro-
vided by a statistical model and the null hypothesis. When the observed value
of the test statistic falls within the critical range the result is ‘significant’ and
the analyst discards the null hypothesis. When the observed test statistic falls
outside the critical range the result is ‘not significant’ and the null hypothesis
is not discarded.
In current practice, dichotomisation of results into significant and not signif-
icant is most often made on the basis of the observed P-value being less than or
greater than a conventional threshold of 0.05, so we have the familiar P< 0.05
for α = 0.05. The one-to-one relationship between the test statistic being within
the critical range and the P-value being less than α means that such practice
is not intrinsically problematical, but using a P-value as an intermediate in a
hypothesis test obscures the nature of the test and contributes to the conflation
3The ‘power’ of the experiment is one minus the false positive error rate, but it is a function
of the true effect size, as explained later.
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of significance tests and hypothesis tests.
The classical Neyman–Pearsonian hypothesis test is an acceptance proce-
dure, or a decision theory procedure [Birnbaum, 1977, Hurlbert and Lombardi,
2009] that does not require, or provide, a P-value. Its output is a binary deci-
sion: either reject the null hypothesis or fail to reject the null hypothesis. In
contrast, a Fisherian significance test yields a P-value that encodes the evidence
in the data against the null hypothesis, but not, directly, a decision. The P-
value is the probability of observing data as extreme as that observed, or more
extreme, when the null hypothesis is true. That probability is generated or
determined by a statistical model of some sort, and so we should really include
the phrase ‘according to the statistical model’ into the definition. In the Fish-
erian tradition4 a P-value is interpreted evidentially: the smaller the P-value
the stronger the evidence against the null hypothesis and the more implausible
the null hypothesis is, according to the statistical model. No behavioural or
inferential consequences attach to the observed P-value and no threshold need
be applied because the P-value is a continuous index.
In practice the probabilistic nature of P-values has proved difficult to use
because people tend to mistakenly assume that the P-value measures the proba-
bility of the null hypothesis or the probability of an erroneous decision—it seems
that they prefer any probability that is more noteworthy or less of a mouthful
than the probability according to a statistical model of observing data as ex-
treme or more extreme when the null hypothesis is true. Happily, there are no
ordinary uses of P-values that require them to be interpreted as probabilities.
My advice is to forget that P-values can be defined as probabilities and instead
look at them as indices of surprisingness or unusualness of data: the smaller
the P-value the more surprising are the data compared to what the statistical
model predicts when the null hypothesis is true.
Conflation of significance tests and hypothesis tests may be encouraged by
their apparently equivalent outputs (significance and P-values), but the confla-
tion is too often encouraged by textbook authors, even to the extent of pre-
senting a hybrid approach containing features of both. The problem has deep
roots: when Neyman & Pearson published their hypothesis test in 1933 it was
immediately assumed that their test was an extension of Fisher’s significance
tests. Substantive differences in the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings
4 It has been argued that because Fisher regularly described experimental results as ‘sig-
nificant’ or ’not significant’ he was treating P-values dichotomously and that he used a fixed
threshold for that dichotomisation (e.g. [Lehmann, 2011, pp. 51–53]). However, Fisher meant
the word ‘significant’ to denote only that a result that is worthy of attention and follow up,
and he quoted P-values as being less than 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 because he was was work-
ing from tables of critical values of test statistics rather than laboriously calculating exact
P-values manually. He wrote about the issue on several occasions, for example this:
Convenient as it is to note that a hypothesis is contradicted at some familiar level
of significance such as 5% or 2% or 1% we do not, in Inductive Inference, ever
need to lose sight of the exact strength which the evidence has in fact reached,
or to ignore the fact that with further trial it might come to be stronger, or
weaker. —[Fisher, 1960, p. 25]
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soon became apparent to the protagonists and a long-lasting and bitter personal
enmity developed between Fisher and Neyman [Lenhard, 2006, Lehmann, 2011].
That feud seems likely to be one of the causes of the confusion that we have
today as it has been suggested that authors of statistics textbooks avoided tak-
ing sides in the feud—an understandable response given vehemence and the
forceful personalities of the protagonists—either by presenting only one of the
approaches without mention of the other or by presenting a mixture of both
[Cowles, 1989, Huberty, 1993, Halpin and Stam, 2006].
Whatever the origin of the confusion, the fact that significance tests and
hypothesis tests are rarely explained as distinct alternatives in textbooks, en-
courages many to mistakenly assume that ‘significance test’ and ‘hypothesis
test’ are synonyms. It also encourages the use a hybrid of the two which is com-
monly called NHST (for Null Hypothesis Significance Test). NHST has been
derided, for example as an “inconsistent mishmash” Gigerenzer [1998] and as a
“jerry-built framework” [Krueger and Heck, 2017, p. 1] but versions of NHST
are nonetheless more common than well-constructed hypothesis tests and signif-
icance tests together. Users of NHST almost universally assume that they are
‘doing it right’ and the assumption that P-value equals NHST persists, largely
unnoticed, particularly in the commentaries of those clamouring for the elimi-
nation of P-values. I therefore feel compelled to add to the list of derogatory
epithets: NHST is like a reverso-platypus. The platypus was at one time derided
as a fake5—a composite creature consisting of parts of several animals—but is
a real animal, rare but beautiful, and perfectly adapted to its ecological niche.
The common NHST is assumed by its many users to be a proper statistical
procedure but is, in fact, an ugly composite, maladapted for almost all analytic
purposes.
3.2 Contradictory instructions
No-one should be using NHST, but should we use hypothesis testing or signif-
icance testing? The answer should depend on what your analytical objectives
are, but in practice it more often depends on who you ask. Not all advice is good
advice, and not even the experts agree. Responses to the American Statistical
Association’s official statement on P-values provides a case in point. In response
to the widespread expressions of concern over the misuse and misunderstanding
of P-values, the ASA convened a group of experts to consider the issues and to
collaborate on drafting an official statement on P-values [Wasserstein and Lazar,
2016]. Invited commentaries were published alongside the final statement, and
even a brief reading of those commentaries on the statement will turn up mis-
givings and disagreements. Given that most of the commentaries were written
5Well, that’s the conventional wisdom, but it may be an exaggeration. The first scientific
description of the “duck-billed platypus” was done in England by Shaw & Nodder (1789),
who wrote “Of all Mammalia yet known it seems the most extraordinary in its conformation;
exhibiting the perfect resemblance of the beak of a Duck engrafted on the head of a quadruped.
So accurate is the similitude that, at first view, it naturally excites the idea of some deceptive
preparation by artificial means”. If Shaw & Nodder really thought it a fake, they did not do
so for long.
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by participants in the expert group, such disquiet and dissent confirms the dif-
ficulty of this topic. It should also should signal to readers that their practical
familiarity with P-values does not ensure that they understand P-values.
The official ASA statement on P-values sets out six numbered principles
concerning P-values and scientific inference:
1. P-values can indicate how incompatible the data are with a specified sta-
tistical model.
2. P-values do not measure the probability that the studied hypothesis is
true, or the chance that the data were produced by random chance.
3. Scientific conclusions and business or policy decisions should not be based
only on whether a P-value passes a specific threshold.
4. Proper inference requires full reporting and transparency.
5. A P-value, or statistical significance, does not measure the size of an effect
or the importance of a result.
6. By itself, a P-value does not provide a good measure of evidence regarding
a model or hypothesis.
Those principles are all sound—some derive directly from the definition of
P-values and some are self-evidently good advice about the formation and re-
porting of scientific conclusions—but hypothesis tests and significance tests are
not even mentioned in the statement and so it does not directly answer the
question about whether we should use significance tests or hypothesis tests that
I asked at the start of this section. Nevertheless, the statement offers a useful
perspective and is not entirely neutral on the question. It urges against the use
of a threshold in Principle 3 which says “Scientific conclusions and business or
policy decisions should not be based only on whether a p-value passes a specific
threshold.” Without a threshold we cannot use a hypothesis test. Lest any
reader think that the intention is that P-values should not be used, I point out
that the explanatory note for that principle in the ASA document begins thus:
Practices that reduce data analysis or scientific inference to mechan-
ical “bright-line” rules (such as “p < 0.05”) for justifying scientific
claims or conclusions can lead to erroneous beliefs and poor decision
making. —[Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016, p. 131]
“Bright-line rule” is an American legal phrase denoting an approach to sim-
plifying ambiguous or complex legal issues by establishment of a clear, consistent
ruling on the basis of objective factors. In other words, subtleties of circum-
stance and subjective factors are ignored in favour of consistency and simplicity.
Such a rule might be useful in the legal setting, but it does not sound like an
approach well-suited to the considerations that should underlie scientific infer-
ence. It is unfortunate, therefore, that a mechanical bright-line rule is so often
used in basic pharmacological research, and even worse that it is demanded by
the instructions to authors of the British Journal of Pharmacology :
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Control Test 1
20
30
P=0.06
Control Test 2
20
30
P=0.04
Figure 1: P=0.04 is not very different from P=0.06. Pseudo-data devised to
yield one-tailed P=0.06 (left) and P=0.04 (right) from a Student’s t-test for
independent samples, n = 5 per group. The y-axis is an arbitrarily scaled
measure.
When comparing groups, a level of probability (P ) deemed to con-
stitute the threshold for statistical significance should be defined in
Methods, and not varied later in Results (by presentation of multi-
ple levels of significance). Thus, ordinarily P < 0.05 should be used
throughout a paper to denote statistically significant differences be-
tween groups. —[Curtis et al.,
2015]
An updated version of the guidelines retains those instructions [?], but be-
cause it is a bad instruction I present three objections. The first is that routine
use of an arbitrary P-value threshold for declaring a result significant ignores
almost all of the evidential content of the P-value by forcing an all-or-none
distinction between a P-value small enough and one not small enough. The ar-
bitrariness of a threshold for significance is well known and flows from the fact
that there is no natural cutoff point or inflection point in the scale of P-values.
Anyone who is unconvinced that it matters should note that the evidence in a
result of P=0.06 is not so different from that in a result of P=0.04 as to support
an opposite conclusion (Figure 1).
The second objection to the instruction to use a threshold of P< 0.05 is that
exclusive focus on whether the result is above or below the threshold blinds
analysts to information beyond the sample in question. If the statistical proce-
dure says discard the null hypothesis (or don’t discard it) then that statistical
decision seems to override and make redundant any further considerations of ev-
idence, theory, or scientific merit. That is quite dangerous, because all relevant
material should be considered and integrated into scientific inferences.
The third objection refers to the strength of evidence needed to reach the
threshold: the British Journal of Pharmacology instruction licenses claims on
the basis of relatively weak evidence.6 The evidential disfavouring of the null
6Accepting P=0.05 as a sufficient reason to suppose that a treatment is effective is akin to
accepting 50% as a passing grade: it’s traditional in many settings, but it’s far from reassuring.
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hypothesis in a P-value close to 0.05 is surprisingly weak when viewed as a
likelihood ratio or Bayes factor [Goodman and Royall, 1988, Johnson, 2013,
Benjamin et al., 2018], a weakness that can be confirmed by simply ‘eyeballing’
Figure 1.
A fixed threshold corresponding to weak evidence might sometimes be rea-
sonable, but often it is not. As Carl Sagan said: “Extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence.”7 It would be possible to overcome this last objection
by setting a lower threshold whenever an extraordinary claim is to be made,
but the British Journal of Pharmacology instructions preclude such a choice by
insisting that the same threshold be applied to all tests within the whole study.
There has been a serious proposal that a lower default threshold of P< 0.005
be adopted as the default [Johnson, 2013, Benjamin et al., 2018], but even if that
would ameliorate the weakness of evidence objection, it doesn’t address all of
the problems posed by dichotomising results into significant and not significant,
as is acknowledged by the many authors of that proposal.
Should the British Journal of Pharmacology enforce its guideline on the use
of Neyman–Pearsonian hypothesis testing with a fixed threshold for statisti-
cal significance? Definitely not, and laboratory pharmacologists should usually
avoid them because the nature those tests is ill-suited to the reality of basic
pharmacological studies.
The shortcoming of hypothesis testing is that it offers an all-or-none out-
come and it engenders a one-and-done response to an experiment. All-or-none
in that the significant or not significant outcome is dichotomous. One-and-done
because once a decision has been made to reject the null hypothesis there is lit-
tle apparent reason to re-test that null hypothesis the same way, or differently.
There is no mechanism within the classical Neyman–Pearsonian hypothesis test-
ing framework for a result to be treated as provisional. That is not particularly
problematical in the context of a classical randomised clinical trial (RCT) be-
cause an RCT is usually conducted only after preclinical studies have addressed
the relevant biological questions. That allows the scientific aims of the study
to be simple—they are designed to provide a definitive answer to the primary
question. An all-or-none one-and-done hypothesis test is therefore appropriate
for an RCT.8 But the majority of basic pharmacological laboratory studies do
not have much in common with an RCT because they consist of a series of
interlinked and inter-related experiments contributing variously to the primary
inference. For example, a basic pharmacological study will often include experi-
ments that validate experimental methods and reagents, concentration-response
curves for one or more of drugs, positive and negative controls, and other exper-
iments subsidiary to the main purpose of the study. The design of the ‘headline’
experiment (assuming there is one) and interpretation of its results is dependent
7That phrase comes from the television series Cosmos, 1980, but may derive from Laplace
(1812), who wrote “The weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned
to its strangeness.” [translated, the original is in French].
8Clinical trials are sometimes aggregated in meta-analyses, but the substrate for meta-
analytical combination is the observed effect sizes and sample sizes of the individual trials,
not the dichotomised significant or not significant outcomes.
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on the results of those subsidiary experiments, and even when there is a singu-
lar scientific hypothesis, it might be tested in several ways using observations
within the study. It is the aggregate of all of the experiments that inform the
scientific inferences. The all-or-none one-and-done outcome of a hypothesis test
is less appropriate to basic research than it is to a clinical trial.
Pharmacological laboratory experiments also differ from RCTs in other ways
that are relevant to the choice of statistical methodologies. Compared to an
RCT, basic pharmacological research is very cheap, the experiments can be
completed very quickly, with the results available for analysis almost imme-
diately. Those advantages mean that a pharmacologist might design some of
the experiments within a study in response to results obtained in that same
study,9 and so a basic pharmacological study will often contain preliminary or
exploratory research. Basic research and clinical trials also differ in the conse-
quences of erroneous inference. A false positive in an RCT might prove very
damaging by encouraging the adoption of an ineffective therapy, but in the much
more preliminary world of basic pharmacological research a false positive result
might have relatively little influence on the wider world. It could be argued
that statistical protections against false positive outcomes that are appropriate
in the realm of clinical trials can be inappropriate in the realm of basic research.
This idea is illustrated in a later section of this chapter.
The multi-faceted nature of the basic pharmacological study means that
statistical approaches yielding dichotomous yes or no outcomes are less relevant
than they are to the archetypical RCT. The scientific conclusions drawn from
basic pharmacological experiments should be based on thoughtful consideration
of the entire suite of results in conjunction with any other relevant information,
including both pre-existing evidence and theory. The dichotomous all-or-none,
one-and-done hypothesis test is poorly adapted to the needs of basic pharmaco-
logical experiments, and is probably poorly adapted to the needs of most basic
scientific studies. Scientific studies depend on a detailed evaluation of evidence
but a hypothesis test does not fully support such an evaluation.
3.3 Evidence is local; error rates are global
A way to understand difference between the Fisherian significance test and the
Neyman–Pearsonian hypothesis test is to recognise that the former supports
‘local’ inference, whereas the latter is designed to protect against ‘global’ long-
run error. The P-value of a significance test is local because it is an index of the
evidence in this data against this null hypothesis. In contrast, the hypothesis
test decision regarding rejection of the null hypothesis is global because it is
based on a parameter, α, which is set without reference to the observed data.
The long run performance of the hypothesis test is a property of the procedure
itself and is independent of any particular data, and so it is global. Local
evidence; global errors. This is not an ahistoric imputation, because Neyman
9Yes, that is also done in ‘adaptive’ clinical trials, but they are not the archetypical RCT
that is the comparator here.
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& Pearson were clear about their preference for global error protection rather
than local evidence and their objectives in devising hypothesis tests:
We are inclined to think that as far as a particular hypothesis is
concerned, no test based upon the theory of probability can by it-
self provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of that
hypothesis.
But we may look at the purpose of tests from another view-point.
Without hoping to know whether each separate hypothesis is true
or false, we may search for rules to govern our behaviour with re-
gard to them, in following which we insure that, in the long run of
experience, we shall not be too often wrong.
—Neyman and Pearson [1933]
The distinction between local and global properties or information is rel-
atively little known, but Liu & Meng 2016 offer a much more technical and
complete discussion of the local/global distinction, using the descriptors ‘indi-
vidualised’ and ‘relevant’ for the local and the ‘robust’ for the global. They
demonstrate a trade-off between relevance and robustness that requires judge-
ment on the part of the analyst. In short, the desirability of methods that have
good long-run error properties is undeniable, but paying attention exclusively to
the global blinds us to the local information that is relevant to inferences. The
instructions of the British Journal of Pharmacology are inappropriate because
they attend entirely to the global and because the dichotomising of each exper-
imental result into significant and not significant hinders thoughtful inference.
Many of the battles and controversies regarding statistical tests swirl around
issues that might be clarified using the local versus global distinction, and so it
will be referred to repeatedly in what follows.
3.4 On the scaling of P-values
In order to be able to safely interpret the local, evidential, meaning of a P-
value, a pharmacologist should understand its scaling. Just like the EC50s with
which pharmacologists are so familiar, P-values have a bounded scale, and just
as is the case with EC50s it makes sense to scale P-values geometrically (or
logarithmically). The non-linear relationship between P-values and an intuitive
scaling of evidence against the null hypothesis can be gleaned from Figure 2. Of
course, a geometric scaling of the evidential meaning of P-values implies that the
descriptors of evidence should be similarly scaled and so such a scale is proposed
in Figure 3, with P-values around 0.05 being called ‘trivial’ in recognition of the
relatively unimpressive evidence for a real difference between condition A and
control in Figure 2.
Attentive readers will have noticed that the P-values in Figures 1, 2, and
3 are all one-tailed. The number of tails that published P-values have is in-
consistent, is often unspecified, and the number of tails that a P-value should
have is controversial (e.g. see Dubey [1991], Bland and Bland [1994], Kobayashi
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Figure 2: What simple evidence looks like. Pseudo-data devised to yield one-
tailed P-values from 0.05 to 0.0001 from a Student’s t-test for independent
samples, n = 5 per group. The left-most group of values is the control against
which each of the other sets is compared, and the pseudo-datasets A, B, C, and
D were generated by arithmetic adjustment of a single dataset to obtain the
indicated P-values. The y-axis is an arbitrarily scaled measure.
[1997], Freedman [2008], Lombardi and Hurlbert [2009], Ruxton and Neuhaeuser
[2010]). Arguments about P-value tails are regularly confounded by differences
between local and global considerations. The most compelling reasons to favour
two tails relate to global error rates, which means that they apply only to P-
values that are dichotomised into significant and not significant in a hypothesis
test. Those arguments can safely be ignored when P-values are used as indices
of evidence and I therefore recommend one-tailed P-values for general use in
pharmacological experiments—as long as the P-values are interpreted as evi-
dence and not as a surrogate for decision. (Either way, the number of tails
should always be specified.)
3.5 Power and expected P-values
The Neyman–Pearsonian hypothesis test is a decision procedure that, with a
few assumptions, can be an optimal procedure. Optimal only in the restricted
sense that the smallest sample gives the highest power to reject the null hypoth-
esis when it is false, for any specified rate of false positive errors. To achieve
that optimality the experimental sample size and α are selected prior to the
experiment using a power analysis and with consideration of the costs of the
two specified types of error and the benefits of potentially correct decisions. In
other words, there is a loss function built into the design of experiments. How-
ever, outside of the clinical trials arena, few pharmacologists seem to design
experiments in that way. For example, a study of 22 basic biomedical research
papers published in Nature Medicine found that none of them included any
mention of a power analysis for setting the sample size [Strasak et al., 2007],
and a simple survey of the research papers in the most recent issue of British
Journal of Pharmacology (2018, issue 17 of volume 175) gives a similar picture
with power analyses specified in only one out the 11 research papers that used
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Figure 3: Evidential descriptors for P-values. Strength of evidence against
the null hypothesis scales semi-geometrically with the smallness of the P-value.
Note that the descriptors for strength of evidence are illustrative only, and it
would be a mistake to assume, for example, that a P-value of 0.001 indicates
moderately strong evidence against the null hypothesis in every circumstance.
P < 0.05 as a criterion for statistical significance. It is notable that all of those
BJP papers included statements in their methods sections claiming compliance
with the guidelines for experimental design and analysis, guidelines that include
this as the first key point:
Experimental design should be subjected to a priori power analysis
so as to ensure that the size of treatment and control groups is
adequate[. . . ] —[Curtis et al., 2015]
The most recent issue of Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeu-
tics (2018, issue 3 of volume 366) similarly contains no mention of power of
sample size determination in any of its 9 research papers, although none of its
authors had to pay lip service to guidelines requiring it.
In reality, power analyses are not always necessary or helpful. They have
no clear role in the design of a preliminary or exploratory experiment that
is concerned more with hypothesis generation than hypothesis testing, and a
large fraction of the experiments published in basic pharmacological journals are
exploratory or preliminary in nature. Nonetheless, they are described here in
detail because experience suggests they are mysterious to many pharmacologists
and they are very useful for planning confirmatory experiments.
For a simple test like Student’s t-test a pre-experiment power analysis for
determination of sample size is easily performed. The power of a Student’s t-
test is dependent on: (i) the predetermined acceptable false positive error rate,
α (bigger α gives more power); (ii) the true effect size, which we will denote
as δ (more power when δ is larger); (iii) the population standard deviation, σ
(smaller σ gives more power); and (iv) the sample size (larger n for more power).
The common approach to a power test is to specify an effect size of interest and
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Figure 4: Power functions for α = 0.05 and 0.005. Power of one-sided Student’s
t-test for independent samples expressed as a function of standardised true effect
size δ/σ for sample sizes (per group) from n = 3 to n = 40. Note that δ = µ1−µ2
and σ are population parameters rather than sample estimates.
the minimum desired power, so say we wish to detect a true effect of δ = 3 in a
system where we expect the standard deviation to be σ = 2. The free software10
called R has the function power.t.test() that gives this result:
> power.t.test(delta=3, sd=2, power=0.8, sig.level = 0.05,
alternative =’one.sided’, n=NULL)
Two-sample t test power calculation
n = 6.298691
delta = 3
sd = 2
sig.level = 0.05
power = 0.8
alternative = one.sided
NOTE: n is number in *each* group
It is conventional to round the sample size up to the next integer so the sample
size would be 7 per group.
While a single point power analysis like that is straightforward, it provides
relatively little information compared to the information supplied by the analyst,
and its output is specific to the particular effect size specified, an effect size that
more often than not has to be ‘guesstimated’ instead of estimated because it is
the unknown that is the object of study. A plot of power versus effect size is
far more informative than the point value supplied by the conventional power
test (Figure 4). Those graphical power functions show clearly the three-way
relationship between sample size, effect size and the risk of a false negative
outcome (i.e. one minus the power).
10www.r-project.org
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Some experimenters are tempted to perform a post-experiment power anal-
ysis when their observed P-value is unsatisfyingly large. They aim to answer
the question of how large the sample should have been, and proceed to plug in
the observed effect size and standard deviation and pulling out a larger sam-
ple size—always larger—that might have given them the desired small P-value.
Their interpretation is then that the result would have been significant but for
the fact that the experiment was underpowered. That interpretation ignores
that fact that the observed effect size might be an exaggeration, or the observed
standard deviation might be an underestimation and the null hypothesis might
be true! Such a procedure is generally inappropriate and dangerous [Hoenig
and Heisey, 2001]. There is a one to one correspondence of observed P-value
and post-experiment power and no matter what the sample size, a larger than
desired P-value always corresponds to a low power at the observed effect size,
whether the null hypothesis is true or false. Power analyses are useful in the
design of experiments, not for the interpretation of experimental results.
Power analyses are tied closely to dichotomising Neyman–Pearsonian hy-
pothesis tests, even when expanded to provide full power functions as in Figure
4. However, there is an alternative more closely tied to Fisherian significance
testing—an approach better aligned to the objectives of evidence gathering.
That alternative is a plot of average expected P-values as functions of effect
size and sample size [Sackrowitz and Samuel-Cahn, 1999, Bhattacharya and
Habtzghi, 2002]. The median is more relevant than the mean, both because the
distribution of expected P-values is very skewed and because the median value
offers a convenient interpretation of there being a 50:50 bet that and observed
P-value will be either side of it. An equivalent plot showing the 90th percentile
of expected P-values gives another option for experiment sample size planning
purposes (Figure 5).
Should the British Journal of Pharmacology enforce its power guideline? In
general no, but pharmacologists should use power curves or expected P-value
curves for designing some of their experiments, and ought to say so when they
do. Power analyses for sample size are very important for experiments that are
intended to be definitive and decisive, and that’s why sample size considerations
are dealt with in detail when planning clinical trials. Even though the majority
of experiments in basic pharmacological research papers are not like that, as
discussed above, even preliminary experiments should be planned to a degree,
and power curves and expected P-value curves are both useful in that role.
4 Practical problems with P-values
The sections above deal with the most basic misconceptions regarding the nature
of P-values, but critics of P-values usually focus on other important issues. In
this section I will deal with the significance filter, multiple comparisons, and
some forms of P-hacking, and I need to point out immediately that most of
the issues are not specific to P-values even if some of them are enabled by
the unfortunate dichotomisation of P-values into significant and not significant.
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Figure 5: Expected P-value functions P-values expected from Student’s t-test
for independent samples expressed as a function of standardised true effect size
δ/σ for sample sizes (per group) from n = 3 to n = 40. The graph on the
left shows the median of expected P-values (i.e. the 50th percentile) and the
graph on the right shows the 90th percentile. It can be expected that 50% of
observed P-values will lie below the median lines and 90% will lie below the
90th percentile lines for corresponding sample sizes and effect sizes. The dashed
lines indicate P=0.05 and 0.005.
In other words, the practical problems with P-values are largely the practical
problems associated with the misuse of P-values and with sloppy statistical
inference generally.
4.1 The significance filter exaggeration machine
It is natural to assume that the effect size observed in an experiment is a good
estimate of the true effect size, and in general that can be true. However,
there are common circumstances where the observed effect size consistently
overestimates the true, sometimes wildly so. The overestimation depends on
the facts that experimental results exaggerating the true effect are more likely
to be found statistically significant, and that we pay more attention to the
significant results and are more likely to report them. The key to the effect
is selective attention to a subset of results—the significant results—and so the
process is appropriately called the significance filter.
If there is nothing assume nothing untoward in the sampling mechanism,11
sample means are unbiassed estimators of population means and sample-based
standard deviations are nearly unbiassed estimators of population standard de-
viations.12 Because of that we can assume that, on average, a sample mean
11That is not a safe assumption, in particular because a haphazard sample is not a random
sample. When was the last time that you used something like a random number generator
for allocation of treatments?
12The variance is unbiassed but the non-linear square root transformation into the standard
deviation damages that unbiassed-ness. Standard deviations calculated from small samples
are biassed toward underestimation of the true standard deviation. For example, if the true
standard deviation is 1 the expected average observed standard deviation for samples of n = 5
is 0.92.
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provides a sensible ‘guesstimate’ for the population parameter and, to a lesser
degree, so does the observed standard deviation. That is indeed the case for
averages over all samples, but it cannot be relied upon for any particular sam-
ple. If attention has been drawn to a sample on the basis that it is ‘statistically
significant’ then that sample is likely to offer an exaggerated picture of the true
effect. The phenomenon is usually called the significance filter. The way it
works is fairly easily described but, as usual, there are some complexities in its
interpretation.
Say we are in the position to run an experiment 100 times with random
samples of n = 5 from a single normally distributed population with mean
µ = 1 and standard deviation σ = 1. We would expect that, on average, the
sample means, x¯ would be scattered symmetrically around the true value of
1, and the sample-based standard deviations, s, would be scattered around the
true value of 1, albeit slightly asymmetrically. A set of 100 simulations matching
that scenario show exactly that result (see the left panel of Figure 6), with the
median of x¯ being 0.97 and the median of s being 0.94, both of which are close
to the expected values of exactly 1 and about 0.92, respectively. If we were to
pay attention only to the results where the observed P-value was less than 0.05
(with the null hypothesis being that the population mean is 0), then we get
a different picture because the values are very biassed (see the right panel of
Figure 6). Among the ‘significant’ results the median sample mean is 1.2 and
the median standard deviation is 0.78.
The systematic bias of mean and standard deviation among ‘significant’
results in those simulations might not seem too bad, but it is conventional to
scale the effect size as the standardised ratio x¯/s,13 and the median of that ratio
among the ‘significant’ results is fully 50% larger than the correct value. What’s
more, the biasses get worse with smaller samples, with smaller true effect sizes,
and with lower P-value thresholds for ‘significance’.
It is notable that even the results with the most extreme exaggeration of
effect size in Figure 6—550%—would not be counted as an error within the
Neyman–Pearsonian hypothesis testing framework! It would not lead to the
false rejection of a true null or to an inappropriate failure to reject a false null
and so it is neither a type I nor a type II error. But it is some type of error, a
substantial error in estimation of the magnitude of the effect. The term type M
error has been devised for exactly that kind of error [Gelman and Carlin, 2014].
A type M error might be underestimation as well as the overestimation, but
overestimation is the more common in theory [Lu et al., 2018] and in practice
[Camerer et al., 2018].
The effect size exaggeration coming from the significance filter is not a result
of sampling, or of significance testing, or of P-values. It is a result of paying
extra attention to a subset of all results—the ‘significant’ subset.
The significance filter presents a peculiar difficulty. It leads to exaggera-
tion on average, but any particular result may well be close to the correct size
13That ratio is often called Cohen’s d. Pharmacologists should pay no attention to Cohen’s
specifications of small, medium and large effect sizes [Cohen, 1992] because they are much
smaller than the effects commonly seen in basic pharmacological experiments.
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Figure 6: The significance filter. The dots in the graphs are means and standard
deviations of samples of n = 5 drawn from a normally distributed population
with mean µ = 1 and standard deviation σ = 1. The left panel shows all 100
samples and the right panel shows only the results where P<0.05. The vertical
and horizontal lines indicate the true parameter values. ‘Significant’ results
tend to over-estimate the population mean and under-estimate the population
standard deviation.
whether it is ‘significant’ or not. A real-world sample mean of, say, x¯ = 1.5
might be an exaggeration of µ = 1, it might be an underestimation of µ = 2,
or it might be pretty close to µ = 1.4 and there would be no way to be certain
without knowing µ, and if µ were known then the experiment would probably
not have been necessary in the first place. That means that the possibility of
a type M error looms over any experimental result that is interesting because
of a small P-value, and that is particularly true when the sample size is small.
The only way to gain more confidence that a particular significant result closely
approximates the true state of the world is to repeat the experiment–the second
result would not have been run through the significance filter and so its results
would not have a greater than average risk of exaggeration and the overall in-
ference can be informed by both results. Of course, experiments intended to
repeat or replicate an interesting finding should take the possible exaggeration
into account by being designed to have higher power than the original.
4.2 Multiple comparisons
Multiple testing is the situating where the tension between global and local
considerations are most stark. It is also the situation where the well-known
jelly beans cartoon from XKCD.com is irresistable (Figure 7). The cartoon
scenario is that jelly beans were suspected of causing acne, but a test found “no
link between jelly beans and acne (P> 0.05)”, and so the possibility that only a
certain colour of jelly bean causes acne is then entertained. All 20 colours of jelly
bean are independently tested, with only the result from green jelly beans being
significant, “(P< 0.05)”. The newspaper headline at the end of the cartoon
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mentions only the green jelly beans result, and it does that with exaggerated
certainty. The usual interpretation of that cartoon is that the significant result
with green jelly beans is likely to be a false positive because, after all, hypothesis
testing with the threshold of P< 0.05 is expected to yield a false positive one
time in 20, on average, when the null is true.
The more hypothesis tests there are, the higher the risk that one of them will
yield a false positive result. The textbook response to multiple comparisons is
to introduce ‘corrections’ that protect an overall maximum false positive error
rate by adjusting the threshold according to the number of tests in the family
to give protection from inflation of the family-wise false positive error rate. The
Bonferroni adjustment is the best-known method, and while there are several
alternative ‘corrections’ that perform a little better, none of those is nearly as
simple. A Bonferroni adjustment for the family of experiments in the cartoon
would preserve an overall false positive error rate of 5% by setting a threshold
for significance of 0.05/20 = 0.0025 in each of the 20 hypothesis tests.14 It must
be noted that such protection does not come for free, because adjustments for
multiplicity invariably strip statistical power from the analysis.
We do not know whether the ‘significant’ link between green jelly beans and
acne would survive a Bonferroni adjustment because the actual P-values were
not supplied,15 but as an example, a P-value of 0.003, low enough to be quite
encouraging as the result of a significance test, would be ‘not significant’ ac-
cording to the Bonferroni adjustment. Such a result that would present us with
a serious dilemma because the inference supported by the local evidence would
be apparently contradicted by global error rate considerations. However, that
contradiction is not what it seems because the null hypothesis of the significance
test P-value is a different null hypothesis from that tested by the Bonferroni-
adjusted hypothesis test. The significance test null concerns only the green jelly
beans whereas the null hypothesis of the Bonferroni is an omnibus null hypoth-
esis that says that the link between green jelly beans on acne is zero and the
link between purple jelly beans on acne is zero and the link between brown jelly
beans is zero, and so on. The P-value null hypothesis is local and the omnibus
null is global. The global null hypothesis might be appropriate before the evi-
dence is available (i.e. for power calculations and experimental planning), but
after the data are in hand the local null hypothesis concerning just the green
jelly beans gains importance.
It is important to avoid being blinded to the local evidence by a non-
significant global. After all, the pattern of evidence in the cartoon is exactly
what would be expected if the green colouring agent caused acne: green jelly
beans are associated with acne but the other colours are not. (The failure to
see an effect of the mixed jelly beans in the first test is easily explicable on
the basis of the lower dose of green.) If the data from the trial of green jelly
14You may notice that the first test of jelly beans without reference to colour has been
ignored here. There is no set rule for saying exactly which experiments constitute a family
for the purposes of correction of multiplicity.
15That serves to illustrate one facet of the inadequacy of reporting ‘P less thans’ in place
of actual P-values.
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Figure 7: Multiple testing cartoon from XKCD, https://xkcd.com/882/
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beans is independent of the data from the trials of other colours, then there is
no way that the existence of those other data—or their analysis—can influence
the nature of the green data. The green jelly bean data cannot logically have
been affected by the fact that mauve and beige jelly beans were tested at a later
point in time—the subsequent cannot affect the previous—and the experimental
system would have to be bizarrely flawed for the testing of the purple or brown
jelly beans to affect the subsequent experiment with green jelly beans. If the
multiplicity of tests did not affect the data then it is only reasonable to say that
it did not affect the evidence.
The omnibus global result does not cancel the local evidence, or even alter
it, and yet the elevated risk of a false positive error is real. That presents us
with a dilemma and, unfortunately, statistics does not provide a way around
it. Global error rates and local evidence operate in different logical spaces
[Thompson, 2007] and so there can be no strictly statistical way to weigh them
together. All is not lost, though, because statistical limitations do not preclude
thoughtful integration of local and the global issues when making inferences. We
just have to be more than normally cautious when the local and global pull in
different directions. For example, in the case of the cartoon, the evidence in the
data favour the idea that green jelly beans are linked with acne (and if we had
an exact P-value then we could specify the strength of favouring) but because
the data were obtained by a method with a substantial false positive error rate
we should be somewhat reluctant to take that evidence at face value. It would
be up to the scientist in the cartoon (the one with safety glasses) to form a
provisional scientific conclusion regarding the effect of green jelly beans, even
if that inference is that any decision should be deferred until more evidence is
available. Whatever the inference, the evidence, theory, the method, any other
corroborating or rebutting information should all be considered and reported.
A man or woman who sits and deals out a deck of cards repeatedly
will eventually get a very unusual set of hands. A report of unusual-
ness would be taken differently if we knew it was the only deal made,
or one of a thousand deals, or one of a million deals, etc. —[Tukey,
1991, p. 133]
In isolation the cartoon experiments are probably only sufficient to suggest
that the association between green jelly acne is worthy of further investigation
(with the earnestness of that suggestion being inversely related to the size of the
relevant P-value). The only way to be in a position to report an inference con-
cerning those jelly beans without having to hedge around the family-wise false
positive error rate and the significance filter is to re-test the green jelly beans.
New data from a separate experiment will be free from the taint of elevated
family-wise error rates and untouched by the significance filter exaggeration
machine. And, of course, all of the original experiments should be reported
alongside the new, as well as reasoned argument incorporating corroborating or
rebutting information and theory.
The fact that a fresh experiment is necessary to allow a straightforward con-
clusion about the effect of the green jelly beans means that the experimental
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series shown in the cartoon is a preliminary, exploratory study. Preliminary or
exploratory research is essential to scientific progress and can merit publication
as long as it is reported completely and openly as preliminary. Too often sci-
entists fall into the pattern of misrepresenting the processes that lead to their
experimental results, perhaps under the mistaken assumption that science has
to be hypothesis driven [Medawar, 1963, du Prel et al., 2009, Howitt and Wil-
son, 2014]. That misrepresentation may take the form of a suggestion, implied
or stated, that the green jelly beans were the intended subject of the study, a
behaviour described as HARKing for hypothesising after the results are known,
or cherry picking where only the significant results are presented. The reason
that HARKing is problematical is that hypotheses cannot be tested using the
data that suggested the hypothesis in the first place because those data always
support that hypothesis (otherwise they would not be suggesting it!), and cherry
picking introduces a false impression of the nature of the total evidence and al-
lows the direct introduction of experimenter bias. Either way, focussing on just
the unusual observations from a multitude is bad science. It takes little effort
and few words to say that 20 colours were tested and only the green yielded a
statistically significant effect, and a scientist can (should) then hypothesise that
green jelly beans cause acne and test that hypothesis with new data.
4.3 P-hacking
P-hacking is where an experiment or its analysis are directed at obtaining a small
enough P-value to claim significance instead of being directed at the clarification
of a scientific issue or testing of a hypothesis. Deliberate P-hacking does happen,
perhaps driven by the incentives built into the systems of academic reward and
publication imperatives, but most P-hacking is accidental—honest researchers
doing ‘the wrong thing’ through ignorance. P-hacking is not always as wrong
as might be assumed, as the idea of P-hacking comes from paying attention
exclusively to global consideration of error rates, and most particularly to false
positive error rates. Those most stridently opposed to P-hacking will point to
the increased risk of false positive errors, but rarely to the lowered risk of false
negative errors. I will recklessly note that some categories of P-hacking look
entirely unproblematical when viewed through the prism of local evidence. The
local versus global distinction allows a more nuanced response to P-hacking.
Some P-hacking is outright fraud. Consider this example that has recently
come to light:
One sticking point is that although the stickers increase apple selec-
tion by 71%, for some reason this is a p value of .06. It seems to me
it should be lower. Do you want to take a look at it and see what
you think. If you can get the data, and it needs some tweeking, it
would be good to get that one value below .05.
—Email from Brian Wansink to David Just on Jan. 7, 2012. [Lee,
2018]
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I do not expect that any readers would find P-hacking of that kind to be accept-
able. However, the line between fraudulent P-hacking and the more innocent
P-hacking through ignorance is hard to define, particularly so given the fact
that some behaviours derided as P-hacking can be perfectly legitimate as part
of a scientific research program. Consider this cherry picked list16 of responses
to a P-value being greater than 0.05 that have been described as P-hacking
[Motulsky, 2014]:
• Analyze only a subset of the data;
• Remove suspicious outliers;
• Adjust data (e.g. divide by body weight);
• Transform the data (i.e. logarithms);
• Repeat to increase sample size (n);
Before going any further I need to point out that Motulsky has a more
realistic attitude to P-hacking than might be assumed from my treatment of
his list. He writes: “If you use any form of P-hacking, label the conclusions as
‘preliminary’.” [Motulsky, 2014, p. 1019].
Analysis of only a subset of the data is illicit if the unanalysed portion is
omitted in order to manipulate the P-value, but unproblematical if it is omitted
for being irrelevant to the scientific question at hand. Removal of suspicious
outliers is similar in being only sometimes inappropriate: it depends on what
is meant by the term “outlier”. If it indicates that a datum is a mistake such
as a typographical or transcriptional error, then of course it should be removed
(or corrected). If an outlier is the result of a technical failure of a particular
run of the experimental then perhaps it should be removed, but the technical
success or failure of an experimental run must not be judged by the influence of
its data on the overall P-value. If with word outlier just denotes a datum that
is further from the mean than the others in the dataset, then omit it at your
peril! Omission of that type of outlier will reduce the variability in the data and
give a lower P-value, but will markedly increase the risk of false positive results
and it is, indeed, an illicit and damaging form of P-hacking.
Adjusting the data by standardisation is appropriate—desirable even—in
some circumstances. For example, if a study concerns feeding or organ masses
then standardising to body weight is probably a good idea. Such manipulation
of data should be considered P-hacking only if an analyst finds a too large P-
value in unstandardised data and then tries out various re-expressions of the
data in search of a low P-value, and then reports the results as if that expres-
sion of the data was intended all along. The P-hackingness of log-transformation
is similarly situationally dependent. Consider pharmacological EC50s or drug
affinities: they are strictly bounded at zero and so their distributions are skewed.
In fact the distributions are quite close to log-normal and so log-transformation
16There are nine specified in the original but I discuss only five: cherry picking!
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before statistical analysis is appropriate and desirable. Log-transformation of
EC50s gives more power to parametric tests and so it is common that signifi-
cance testing of logEC50s gives lower P-values than significance testing of the un-
transformed EC50s. An experienced analyst will choose the log-transformation
because it is known from empirical and theoretical considerations that the trans-
formation makes the data better match the expectations of a parametric sta-
tistical analysis. It might sensibly be categorised as P-hacking only if the log-
transformation was selected with no justification other than it giving a low
P-value.
The last form of P-hacking in the list requires a good deal more consideration
than the others because, well, statistics is complicated. That consideration
is facilitated by a concrete scenario—a scenario that might seem surprisingly
realistic to some readers. Say you run an experiment with n = 5 observations
in each of two independent groups, one treated and one control, and obtain a
P-value of 0.07 from Student’s t-test. You might stop and integrate the very
weak evidence against the null hypothesis into your inferential considerations,
but you decide that more data will clarify the situation. Therefore you run some
extra replicates of the experiment to obtain a total of n = 10 observations in
each group (including the initial 5), and find that the P-value for the data in
aggregate is 0.002. The risk of the ‘significant’ result being a false positive error
is elevated because the data have had two chances to lead you to discard the
null hypothesis. Conventional wisdom says that you have P-hacked. However,
there is more to be considered before the experiment is discarded.
Conventional wisdom usually takes the global perspective. As mentioned
above, it typically privileges false positive errors over any other consideration,
and calls the procedure invalid. However, the extra data has added power to
the experiment and lowered the expected P-value for any true effect size. From
a local evidence point of view, increasing the sample increases the amount of
evidence available for use in inference, which is a good thing. Is extending
an experiment after the statistical analysis a good thing or a bad thing? The
conventional answer is that it is a bad thing and so the conventional advice is
don’t do it! However, a better response might balance the bad effect of extending
the experiment with the good. Consideration of the local and global aspects
of statistical inference allows a much more nuanced answer. The procedure
described would be perfectly acceptable for a preliminary experiment.
Technically the two-stage procedure in that scenario allows optional stopping.
The scenario is not explicit, but it can be discerned that the stopping rule was,
in effect, run n = 5 and inspect the P-value; if it is small enough then stop and
make inferences about the null hypothesis; if the P-value is not small enough for
the stop but nonetheless small enough to represent some evidence against the
null hypothesis, add an extra 5 observations to each group to give n = 10, stop,
and analyse again. We do not know how low the interim P-value would have
to be for the protocol to stop, and we do not know how high it could be and
the extra data still be gathered, but no matter where those thresholds are set,
such stopping rules yield false positive rates higher than the nominal critical
value for stopping would suggest. Because of that, the conventional view (the
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global perspective, of course) is that the protocol is invalid, but it would be more
accurate to say that such a protocol would be invalid unless the P-value or the
threshold for a Neyman–Pearsonian dichotomous decision is adjusted as would
be done with a formal sequential test. It is interesting to note that the elevation
of false positive rate is not necessarily large. Simulations of the scenario as
specified and with P<0.1 as the threshold for continuing show that the overall
false positive error rate would be about 0.008 when the the critical value for
stopping at the first stage is 0.005, and about 0.06 when that critical value is
0.05.
The increased rate of false positives (global error rate) is real, but that
doesn’t mean that the evidential meaning of the final P-value of 0.002 is changed.
It is the same local evidence against the null as if it was obtained from a simpler
one stage protocol with n = 10. After all, the data are exactly the same as if the
experimenter had intended to obtain n = 10 from the beginning. The optional
stopping has changed the global properties of the statistical procedure but not
the local evidence which contained in the actualised data.
You might be wondering how it is possible that the local evidence be un-
affected by a process that increases the global false positive error rate. The
rationale is that the evidence is contained within the data but the error rate is
a property of the procedure—evidence is local and error rates are global. Recall
that false positive errors can only occur when the null hypothesis is true. If
the null is true then the procedure has increased the risk of the data leading
us to a false positive decision, but if the null is false then the procedure has
decreased the risk of a false negative decision. Which of those has paid out in
this case cannot be known because we do not know the truth of this local null
hypothesis. It might be argued that an increase in the global risk of false posi-
tive decisions should outweigh the decreased risk of false negatives, but that is a
value judgement that ought to take into account particulars of the experiment in
question, the role of that experiment in the overall study, and other contextual
factors that are unspecified in the scenario and that vary from circumstance to
circumstance.
So, what can be said about the result of that scenario? The result of P=0.002
provides moderately strong evidence against the null hypothesis, but it was
obtained from a procedure with sub-optimal false positive error characteristics.
That sub-optimality should be accounted for in the inferences that made from
the evidence, but it is only confusing to say that it alters the evidence itself,
because it is the data that contain the evidence and the sub-optimality did not
change the data. Motulsky provides good advice on what to do when your
experiment has the optional stopping:
• For each figure or table, clearly state whether or not the sam-
ple size was chosen in advance, and whether every step used
to process and analyze the data was planned as part of the
experimental protocol.
• If you used any form of P-hacking, label the conclusions as
“preliminary.”
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Given that basic pharmacological experiments are often relatively inexpen-
sive and quickly completed one can add to that list the option of also corrobo-
rating (or not) those results with a fresh experiment designed to have a larger
sample size (remember the significance filter exaggeration machine) and per-
formed according to the design. Once we move beyond the globalist mindset of
one-and-done such an option will seem obvious.
4.4 What is a statistical model?
I remind the reader that this chapter is written under the assumption that
pharmacologists can be trusted to deal with the full complexity of statistics.
That assumption gives me licence to discuss unfamiliar notions like the role of
the statistical model in statistical analysis. All too often the statistical model
is often invisible to ordinary users of statistics and that invisibility encourages
thoughtless use of flawed and inappropriate models, thereby contributing to the
misuse of inferential statistics like P-values.
A statistical model is what allows the formation of calibrated statistical
inferences and non-trivial probabilistic statements in response to data. The
model does that by assigning probabilities to potential arrangements of data. A
statistical model can be thought of as a set of assumptions, although it might be
more realistic to say that a chosen statistical model imposes a set of assumptions
onto the experimenter.
I have often been struck by the extent to which most textbooks, on
the flimsiest of evidence, will dismiss the substitution of assumptions
for real knowledge as unimportant if it happens to be mathemati-
cally convenient to do so. Very few books seem to be frank about, or
perhaps even aware of, how little the experimenter actually knows
about the distribution of errors in his observations, and about facts
that are assumed to be known for the purposes of statistical calcu-
lations. —[Colquhoun, 1971, p.
v]
Statistical models can take a variety of forms [McCullagh, 2002], but the
model for the familiar Student’s t-test for independent samples is reasonably
representative. That model consists of assumed distributions (normal) of two
populations with parameters mean (µ1 and µ2) and standard deviation (σ1
and σ2),
17 and a rule for obtaining samples (e.g. a randomly selected sample of
n = 6 observations from each population). A specified value of the the difference
between means serves as the null hypothesis, so H0 : µ1 − µ2 = δH0 . The test
statistic is18
t =
(x¯1 − x¯2)− δH0
sp
√
1/n1 + 1/n2
17The ordinary Student’s t-test assumes that σ1 = σ2, but the Welch-Scatterthwaite variant
relaxes that assumption.
18Oh no! An equation! Don’t worry, it’s the only one, and, anyway, it is too late now to
stop reading.
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where x¯ is a sample mean and sp is the pooled standard deviation. The explicit
inclusion of a null hypothesis term in the equation for t is relatively rare, but
it is useful because it shows that the null hypothesis is just a possible value of
the difference between means. Most commonly the null hypothesis says that
the difference between means is zero—it can be called a ‘nill-null’—and in that
case the omission of δH0 from the equation makes no numerical difference.
Values of t calculated by that equation have a known distribution when
µ1 − µ2 = δH0 , and that distribution is Student’s t-distribution.19 Because the
distribution is known it is possible to define hypothesis test acceptance regions
for any level of α for a hypothesis test, and any observed t-value can be converted
into a P-value in a significance test.
An important problem that a pharmacologist is likely to face when using
a statistical model is that it’s just a model. Scientific inferences are usually
intended to communicate something about the real world, not the mini world
of a statistical model, and the connection between a model-based probability of
obtaining a test statistic value and the state of the real world is always indirect
and often inscrutable. Consider the meaning conveyed by an observed P-value
of 0.002. It indicates that the data are strange or unusual compared to the
expectations of the statistical model when the parameter of interest is set to the
value specified by the null hypothesis. The statistical model expects a P-value
of, say, 0.002 to occur only 2 times out of a thousand on average when the null
is true. If such a P-value is observed then one of these situations has arisen:
• a two in a thousand accident of random sampling has occurred;
• the null hypothesised parameter value is not close to the true value;
• the statistical model is flawed or inapplicable because one or more of the
assumptions underlying its application are erroneous.
Typically only the first and second are considered, but the last is every
bit as important because when the statistical model is flawed or inapplicable
then the expectations of the model are not relevant to the real world system
that spawned the data. Figure 8 shows the issue diagrammatically. When we
use that statistical inference to inform inferences about the real world we are
implicitly assuming: (i) that the real world system that generated the data is
an analog to the population in the statistical model; (ii) that the way the data
were obtained is well described by the sampling rule of the statistical model;
and (iii) that the observed data is analogous to the random sample assumed in
the statistical model. To the degree that those assumptions are erroneous there
is degradation of the relevance of the model-based statistical inference to the
real world inference that is desired.
Considerations of model applicability are often limited to the population
distribution (is my data normal enough to use a Student’s t-test?) but it is
much more important to consider whether there is a definable population that is
19Technically it’s the central Student’s t-distribution. When δ 6= δH0 it’s a non-central
t-distribution [Cumming and Finch, 2001].
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Figure 8: Diagram of inference using a statistical model.
relevant to the inferential objectives and whether the experimental units (“sub-
jects”) approximate a random sample. Cell culture experiments are notorious
for having ill-defined populations, and while experiments with animal tissues
may have a definable population, the animals are typically delivered from an
animal breeding or holding facility and are unlikely to be a random sample.
Issues like those mean that the calibration of uncertainty offered by statistical
methods might be more or less uncalibrated. For good inferential performance
in the real world, there has to be a flexible and well-considered linking of model-
based statistical inferences and scientific inferences concerning the real world.
5 P-values and inference
A P-value tells you how well the data match with the expectations of a statistical
model when the null hypothesis is true. But, as we have seen, there are many
considerations that have to be made before a low P-value can safely be taken to
provide sufficient reason to say that the null hypothesis is false. What’s more,
inferences about the null hypothesis are not always useful. Royall argues that
there are three fundamental inferential questions that should be considered when
making scientific inferences [Royall, 1997] (here paraphrased and re-ordered):
1. What do these data say?
2. What should I believe now that I have these data?
3. What should I do or decide now that I have these data?
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Those questions are distinct, but not entirely independent and there is no
single best way to answer to any of them.
A P-value from a significance test is an answer to the first question. It
communicates how strongly the data argue against the null hypothesis, with
a smaller P-value being a more insistent shout of “I disagree!”. However, the
answer provided by a P-value is at best incomplete, because it is tied to a partic-
ular null hypothesis within a particular statistical model and because it captures
and communicates only some of the information that might be relevant to sci-
entific inference. The limitations of a P-value can be thought of as analogous to
a black and white photograph that captures the essence of a scene, but misses
coloured detail that might be vital for a correct interpretation.
Likelihood functions provide more detail than P-values and so they can be
superior to P-values as answers to the question of what the data say. However,
they will be unfamiliar to most pharmacologists and they are not immune to
problems relating to the relevance of the statistical model and the peculiarities of
experimental protocol.20 As this chapter is about P-values, we will not consider
likelihoods any further, and those who, correctly, see that they might offer utility
can read Royall’s book [Royall, 1997].
The second of Royall’s questions, What should I believe now that I have
these data?, requires integration of the evidence of the data with what was
believed prior to the evidence being available. A formal statistical combination
of the evidence with prior beliefs can be done using Bayesian methods, but they
are rarely used for the analysis of basic pharmacological experiments and are
outside the scope of this chapter about P-values. Considerations of belief can
be assisted by P-values because when the data argue strongly against the null
hypothesis one should be less inclined to believe it true, but it is important to
realise that P-values do not in any way measure or communicate belief.
The Neyman–Pearsonian hypothesis test framework was devised specifically
to answer the third question: it is a decision theoretic framework. Of course,
it is a good decision procedure only when α is specified prior to the data being
available, and when a loss function informs the experimental design. And it
is only useful when there is a singular decision to be made regarding a null
hypothesis, as can be the case in acceptance sampling and in some randomised
clinical trials. A singular decision regarding a null hypothesis is rarely a sufficient
inference from the collection of experiments and observations that typically
make up a basic pharmacological studies and so hypothesis tests should not
be a default analytical tool (and the hybrid NHST should not be used in any
circumstance).
Readers might feel that this section has failed to provide a clear method for
making inferences about any of the three questions, and they would be correct.
Statistics is a set of tools to help with inferences and not a set of inferential
recipes, a scientific inferences concerning the real world have to be made by sci-
20Royall [1997] and other proponents of likelihood-based inference (e.g. Berger and Wolpert
[1988]) make a contrary argument based on the likelihood principle and the (irrelevance of)
sampling rule principle, but those arguments may fall down when viewed with the local versus
global distinction in mind. Happily, those issues are beyond the scope of this chapter.
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entists, and my intention with this reckless guide to P-values is to encourage an
approach to scientific inference that is more thoughtful than statistical signifi-
cance. After all, those scientists invariably know much more than statistics does
about the real world, and have a superior understanding of the system under
study. Scientific inferences should be made after principled consideration of the
available evidence, theory and, sometimes, informed opinion. A full evaluation
of evidence will include both consideration of the strength of the local evidence
and the global properties of the experimental system and statistical model from
which that evidence was obtained. It is often difficult, just like statistics, and
there is no recipe.
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